La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario
[Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution]
AbstractThe sole ownership solution is an incentive to conserve collective goods but at the same time it can induce a lost of social utility. In the present work the sole ownership solution is analyzed and a synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of collective goods is presented. This paper focuses on the following factors: i) the behaviour of economic agents regarding the social cost linked to the exploitation of collective goods; ii) the market power of the firms exploiting them; iii) the pressure of the demand on the goods.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 51756.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Bienes colectivos; bienes comunes; bienes públicos; sobreexplotación; recursos naturales; externalidades;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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