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La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario
[Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution]

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  • Fuentes Castro, Daniel

Abstract

The sole ownership solution is an incentive to conserve collective goods but at the same time it can induce a lost of social utility. In the present work the sole ownership solution is analyzed and a synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of collective goods is presented. This paper focuses on the following factors: i) the behaviour of economic agents regarding the social cost linked to the exploitation of collective goods; ii) the market power of the firms exploiting them; iii) the pressure of the demand on the goods.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 51756.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51756

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Keywords: Bienes colectivos; bienes comunes; bienes públicos; sobreexplotación; recursos naturales; externalidades;

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  1. Poppe, Matthijs, 2005. "The specificity of social dilemma situations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 431-441, June.
  2. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
  3. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
  4. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
  5. Larson, Bruce A. & Bromley, Daniel W., 1990. "Property rights, externalities, and resource degradation : Locating the tragedy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 235-262, October.
  6. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249.
  7. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311120.
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