The Determinants of Property Rights In U.S. Marine Fisheries
AbstractUsing a sample of fisheries managed under the Magnuson Act, a probit model of the probability of property rights adoption is estimated. The probability of adoption increases as ex–vessel revenue increases and as proxies for transaction costs decrease.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0304004.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 22 Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf ; prepared on IBM PC ; pages: 10; figures: Included. Draft Version, Do Not Cite WO permission
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Fishery Management; Property Rights; Natural Resources;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-04-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2003-04-27 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-LAW-2003-04-27 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2003-04-29 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
- Agnello, Richard J & Donnelley, Lawrence P, 1975. "Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 521-33, October.
- Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
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