Electoral Competiton and Optimal Tariffs
AbstractI show that the unique Nash equilibrium of a model of political competition between two parties in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting entails differentiated trade policies, with a party proposing a high tariff, and the other one a low one. The basic departure from a median voter model is the introduction of campaign contributions, which influence the vote of a group of uninformed voters. Parties are Downsian, not ideological, yet campaign contributions create an asymmetry between them. Thus, the heterogeneous behavior of parties, protectionism and pro-trade, is endogenously decided, rather than a prior assumed in previous works.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 0509002.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 05 Sep 2005
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24. Please contact the author for the detail mathematical proof if interested.
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tariff; political competition; median voter;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Protection for Sale,"
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