I show that the unique Nash equilibrium of a model of political competition between two parties in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting entails differentiated trade policies, with a party proposing a high tariff, and the other one a low one. The basic departure from a median voter model is the introduction of campaign contributions, which influence the vote of a group of uninformed voters. Parties are Downsian, not ideological, yet campaign contributions create an asymmetry between them. Thus, the heterogeneous behavior of parties, protectionism and pro-trade, is endogenously decided, rather than a prior assumed in previous works.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number
0509002.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: 05 Sep 2005 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0509002
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Country and Industry Studies of Trade P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)