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Integrating Competition Policy and Innovation Policy: The Case of R&D Cooperation

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  • Georg von Graevenitz

    (INNO-tec, Munich School of Management)

Abstract

This paper considers the integration of competition policy and innovation policy in the context of R&D cooperation. An explicit comparison of the welfare losses under ex-ante and ex-post R&D cooperation reveals differing incentives to undertake R&D in both regimes. The strength of these incentives is related to the degree of product market competition. We show that there is a clear relationship between the degree of competition in the product market and the relative performance of firms under ex-ante and ex-post cooperation. We derive implications for the design of competition policy rules.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/io/papers/0503/0503006.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0503006.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 15 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0503006

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Competition Policy; Innovation Policy; R&D Cooperation; Licensing; Research Joint Venture; Oligopolistic R&D;

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  1. Loury, Glenn C, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410, August.
  2. Shapiro, Carl & Willig, Robert D, 1990. "On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 113-30, Summer.
  3. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  4. Anand, Bharat N & Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 103-35, March.
  5. D Leahy & J.P. Neary, 1995. "Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries," CEP Discussion Papers dp0270, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  6. David Encaoua & Abraham Hollander, 2002. "Competition Policy and Innovation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00185360, HAL.
  7. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
  8. Howitt, Peter & Griffith, Rachel & Aghion, Philippe & Blundell, Richard & Bloom, Nick, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship," Scholarly Articles 4481507, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Jan Boone, 2000. "Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product and Process Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 549-569, Autumn.
  10. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1997. "Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(1997 Micr), pages 283-349.
  11. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Ulph, David, 1998. "Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 333-57, September.
  12. Oxley, Joanne E, 1997. "Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 387-409, October.
  13. Boone, J., 2000. "Competition," Discussion Paper 2000-104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
  15. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May.
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