Marco Novarese (Centre for Cognitive Economics - Università del Piemonte Orientale) Salvatore Rizzello (Centre for Cognitive Economics - Università del Piemonte Orientale)
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This study describe an experiment on individual learning in the domain of cognitive economics. The authors’ main goal is to observe and to describe how subjects elaborate rules and regularities in problem solving. Involved subjects are asked to choose between different scores related to an evaluation of some hypothetical exams. The game is repeated a wide number of times, sufficient to permit the emergence of accurately observable results. Results seem to show that subjects elaborate coherent rules in a path-dependent way; they manifest a tendency to consolidate these rules also when they are aware that they are wrong; and, at the same time, they exhibit an opposite predisposition not to confirm some rights rules.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
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