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Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals

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Author Info

  • Pierfrancesco La Mura

    (Leipzig Graduate School of Management)

Abstract

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0309/0309001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0309001.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 04 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: strategic games; quantum mechanics; correlated equilibrium; coordination; entanglement; efficiency;

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References

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  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  3. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Bernardo A. Huberman & Tad Hogg HP Laboratories, 2003. "Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 0306005, EconWPA.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. V. I. Danilov & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2005. "Non-classical Measurement Theory: a Framework for Behavioral Sciences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000899, David K. Levine.
  2. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564895, HAL.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00692024 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-control Through Identity Management," PSE Working Papers halshs-00692024, HAL.
  5. David K Levine, 2005. "Quantum Games Have No News For Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001000, David K. Levine.
  6. Jerry Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2009. "TI-games I: An exploration of Type Indeterminacy in strategic decision-making," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566780, HAL.
  7. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "A Connection Between Correlation in Game Theory and Quantum Mechanics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001725, David K. Levine.
  8. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564895 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Brandenburger, Adam, 2010. "The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 175-183, May.
  10. Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2008. "Measurable systems and behavioral sciences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 315-340, May.
  11. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00566780 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590714 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Temzelides, Ted, 2010. "Modeling the act of measurement in the social sciences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 607-615, July.
  14. Emmanuel Haven, 2008. "Private Information and the ‘Information Function’: A Survey of Possible Uses," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 193-228, March.
  15. Adam Brandenburger, 2008. "The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002312, David K. Levine.

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