Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players
AbstractThe Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.
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Date of creation: Jun 2010
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type indeterminacy ; games ; endogeneous preferences;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-CTA-2011-02-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2011-02-19 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-02-19 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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- Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2008. "Measurable systems and behavioral sciences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 315-340, May.
- Pierfrancesco La Mura, 2003. "Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals," Game Theory and Information 0309001, EconWPA.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00692024 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2012.
"Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-control Through Identity Management,"
PSE Working Papers
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Jerome Busemeyer, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(2), pages 97-118, May.
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