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Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players

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Author Info

  • Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

Abstract

The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00564895.

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Date of creation: Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00564895

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Related research

Keywords: type indeterminacy ; games ; endogeneous preferences;

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  1. Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2008. "Measurable systems and behavioral sciences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 315-340, May.
  2. Pierfrancesco La Mura, 2003. "Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals," Game Theory and Information 0309001, EconWPA.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00692024 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-control Through Identity Management," PSE Working Papers halshs-00692024, HAL.

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