Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management
AbstractThe Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state transition process. We define a Markov perfect equilibrium among the selves with individual identity (preferences) as the state variable. The approach allows to characterize generic personality types and derive some comparative static results.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.
Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.mdpi.com/
indeterminacy; decision-making; self-control; identity;
Other versions of this item:
- Jérôme Busemeyer & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2012. "Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-control Through Identity Management," PSE Working Papers halshs-00692024, HAL.
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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