Albanian Political-Economics: Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture
AbstractWe study the politico-economic interaction in a country in transition from a communist regime to a democratic, free market system, to wit, Albania. It is argued that the politico-economic system there is characterized by the existence of clans. Both the communists and the first democratically chosen government applied policies that favored specific clans. Moreover, a popularity function estimation shows that voters related to different clans react in a distinct way to party policies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 0404009.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 20 Apr 2004
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Clans; Albania; popularity functions; government policies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-04-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2004-04-25 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2004-04-25 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gérard, 1993.
"The Design of Reform Packages Under Uncertainty,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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