Lange and Hayek Revisited: Lessons from Czech Voucher Privatization
AbstractA fundamental question in economics since the 1930s has been whether an administrative price system could simulate the results of perfect competition even without a true market for the means of production. The theoretical possibility of such a system has been known since the introduction of market socialism by Oskar Lange. We have used the artificial bidding market involved in the Czech voucher privatization process to test whether a sequential process of trial-and-error can set administrative prices close to equilibrium. It would appear from this natural experiment that Robbins and Hayek were correct in doubting the real-world feasibility of market socialism.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 0012005.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2001
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 12 ; figures: included
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://188.8.131.52
Bidding scheme; Oskar Lange’s model; Privatization; Price setting; Voucher scheme;
Other versions of this item:
- Jan Hanousek & Randall K. Filer, 2000. "Lange and Hayek Revisited: Lessons from Czech Voucher Privatization," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp166, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General
- P22 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Prices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-02-27 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jan Svejnar & Miroslav Singer, 1994. "Using vouchers to privatize an economy: the Czech and Slovak case," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(1), pages 43-69, 03.
- Hingorani, Archana & Lehn, Kenneth & Makhija, Anil K., 1997. "Investor behavior in mass privatization: The case of the Czech voucher scheme," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 349-396, June.
- Jan Hanousek & Eugene Kroch, 1998. "The two waves of voucher privatization in the Czech Republic: a model of learning in sequential bidding," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 133-143.
- Belev, Boyan, 2003. "Institutional investors in Bulgarian corporate governance reform: obstacles or facilitators?," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 361-374, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.