Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?
AbstractThis paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3594.
Date of creation: 01 May 2005
Date of revision:
National Governance; Parliamentary Government; Politics and Government; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2005-12-14 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2005-12-14 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-12-14 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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