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Temporary sequestration credits : an instrument for carbon bears

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Author Info
Kenneth M. Chomitz
Franck Lecocq

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Abstract

Temporary crediting of carbon storage is a proposed instrument that allows entities with emissions reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed period of time. This instrument provides a means of guaranteeing the environmental integrity of a carbon sequestration project. But because the user of the temporary credit takes on the liability of renewing it, or replacing it with a permanent credit, the temporary credit must sell at a discount compared with a permanent credit. The authors show that this discount depends on the expected change in price of a permanent credit. Temporary credits have value only if restrictions on carbon emissions are not expected to tighten substantially. The intuition is illustrated by assessing the value of a hypothetical temporary sulfur dioxide sequestration credit using historical data on actual sulfur dioxide allowance prices.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3181.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3181

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Related research
Keywords: Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Montreal Protocol; Banks&Banking Reform; Environmental Economics&Policies; Financial Intermediation; Environmental Economics&Policies; Carbon Policy and Trading; Montreal Protocol; Banks&Banking Reform; Insurance&Risk Mitigation;

Cited by:
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  1. Gulati, Sumeet & Vercammen, James, 2005. "The Optimal Length Of An Agricultural Carbon Contract," Working Papers 15843, University of British Columbia, Food and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gulati, Sumeet & Vercammen, James, 2005. "Time Inconsistent Resource Conservation Contracts," Working Papers 15838, University of British Columbia, Food and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-18.


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