Economists often advise governments to target their spending better when cuts are called for. The author asks whether that advice is consistent with a political economy constraint that limits the welfare losses to the nonpoor from spending cuts. A simple theoretical model shows that the answer is unclear on a priori grounds and so will depend on the specifics of program design and financing. A case study for a World Bank-supported social program in Argentina illustrates how cuts can come with worse targeting performance: The allocation to the poor falls faster than that to the nonpoor. The author draws some lessons for how the poor might be better protected from cuts.
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Elbers, Chris & Lanjouw, Peter & Mistiaen, Johan & Özler, Berk & Simler, Kenneth, 2003.
"Are neighbors equal?,"
FCND discussion papers
147, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Elbers, Chris & Lanjouw, Peter & Mistiaen, Johan & Özler, Berk & Simler, Kenneth, 2003.
"Are neighbors equal?,"
FCND briefs
147, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
[Downloadable!]