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Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare

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Author Info

  • Federico Etro

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari)

Abstract

I characterize microfounded endogenous market structures with Bertrand and Cournot competition and perform welfare analysis generalizing the Mankiw-Whinston condition for excess entry. The impact of market leaders on welfare is reconsidered, with a number of policy implications about strategic investments, vertical contracts, bundling, mergers and more. The neutrality of consumer surplus holds only when utility is homothetic. Under quantity competition, aggressive (accommodating) leaders increase consumer surplus if the elasticity of utility is decreasing (increasing) in consumption. This provides general rules to evaluate mergers and abuse of dominance issues in antitrust policy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2012_12.

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Length: 18
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2012_12

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Related research

Keywords: Endogenous entry; oligopoly; welfare;

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Cited by:
  1. Chu, Angus C. & Furukawa, Yuichi, 2012. "Patents versus R&D subsidies in a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure," MPRA Paper 41083, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2012.
  2. Angus C., Chu & Lei, Ji, 2012. "Monetary policy and endogenous market structure in a schumpeterian economy," MPRA Paper 41027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Entry deterrrence via renegotiation-proof non-exclusive contracts," Working Papers 1105E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  4. Angus C.Chu & Yuichi Furukawa & Lei Ji, 2013. "Patents RD subsidies and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian economy," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2013-19, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  5. Maria José Gil-Moltó & Dimitrios Varvarigos, 2013. "Endogenous Market Structure, Occupational Choice, and Growth Cycles," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/05, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  6. Colin Davis & Ken-ichi Hashimoto, 2014. "Industry Concentration, Knowledge Diffusion, and Economic Growth Without Scale Effects," Discussion Papers 1408, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.

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