This paper formallizes stories linking vested interests to the non- adoption of superior technologies. Coalitions of workers skilled in the operation of incumbent technologies lobby government for a prohibition on the adoption of better technologies. For reasonable parameter values, we find that the model generates significant levels of protection in equilibrium. The model also generates protection cycles that lead to TFP growth cycles. Protection has a level effect on per capita output. "Productivity slowdowns" lead to increased levels of protection. The level of protection is increasing in the venality of governments. Increased population growth rates increase the value of protection, and can lead to an increase in the level of protection.
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Length: Date of creation: 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:uwo:epuwoc:20043
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Find related papers by JEL classification: O4 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & López-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LopezdeSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
NBER Working Papers
7892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
Working Paper Series
rwp01-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
[Downloadable!]
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian & Alvaro Riascos & James A. Schmitz, Jr., 2004.
"Latin America in the rearview mirror,"
Staff Report
351, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
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