Barriers to Technology Adoption and Entry
AbstractA key feature of recent work on barriers to technology adoption is the assumption that monopoly rights of insiders are limited by the ability of industry outsiders to enter. This paper endogenizes the decision of a government to provide barriers to technology adoption alone or in combination with barriers to entry of outsiders. Using a political economy model, we find that a government provides barriers to both technology adoption and outsider entry. If governments are not too "corrupt", restricting their ability to provide barriers to entry may eliminate barriers to adoption. However, for sufficiently "corrupt" governments, prohibiting barriers to entry leads to more extreme barriers to technology adoption.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute in its series University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers with number 20087.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: Economic Policy Research Institute, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/epri_workingpapers.html
monopoly rights; technology adoption; lobbying; entry;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O4 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
- F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2009-02-14 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MIC-2009-02-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2009-02-14 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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