Markets for information and entertainment are frequently characterized by increasing returns to scale in production and distribution. This implies that incumbent technologies enjoy an advantage over newcomer technologies; such markets can become locked into an inferior technology. Governments often heavily influence media markets through both direct ownership and censorship. I present a dynamic model with heterogeneity among consumers and firms in order to analyze the role of censorship in media markets. I assume there is a negative consumption externality across consumers and a negative cost spillover which an incumbent producer imposes on a newcomer. In a decentralized equilibrium, there is over-production of media from the incumbent technology. This reduces consumer utility and engenders lock-in of the inferior incumbent technology. I model censorship as a tax on information produced under the incumbent technology. A central planner who censors incumbent media can improve upon the decentralized equilibrium by reducing negative consumption externalities and unlocking the superior technology. I also show that censorship is only Pareto optimal when coupled with lump-sum transfers across consumers.
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Paper provided by United States Naval Academy Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
10.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Simeon Djankov & Caralee McLiesh & Tatiana Nenova & Andrei Shleifer, 2001.
"Who Owns the Media?,"
NBER Working Papers
8288, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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