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Social Protection and Human Capital: Test of a Hypothesis

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Author Info
Sauro Mocetti ()

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Abstract

The claim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between social protection and the investment in human capital. The idea is that investment in human capital is risky and therefore, as a prerequisite, needs some kind of protection as insurance. Investments in specific human capital, in particular, are very risky and require a special protection so as not to be avoided. An attempt is made to study the micro foundations of this relationship in depth which afterwards moves on to a macroeconomic analysis. Here a strong link is found between the levels and types of social protection and the skill profiles of a country (as predicted). The clusters we find seem to be in accordance with existing literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’. The last stage of this work is a hypothesis in the opposite direction of the nexus: how the choices of workers and firms influence the institutional framework (endogeneity of institutions of the welfare state). The result of this network of relations seems to be the formation of several organizational equilibria (and not a global convergence) in which institutions shape agents’ behaviour and, at the same time, agents, through their policy preferences, reinforce existing institutional infrastructures.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 425.

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Date of creation: Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:425

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Pagano, Ugo, 1991. "Property Rights, Asset Specificity, and the Division of Labour under Alternative Capitalist Relations," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 315-42, September.
  2. Boeri, Tito & Nicoletti, Giuseppe & Scarpetta, Stefano, 2000. "Regulation And Labour Market Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2420, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
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  4. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta & Olivier Boylaud, 2000. "Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 226, OECD Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Snower, Dennis J., 1994. "The Low-Skill, Bad-Job Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 999, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Finegold, David & Soskice, David, 1988. "The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 21-53, Autumn.
  7. Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Eichengreen, Barry & Iversen, Torben, 1999. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Labour Market," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 121-38, Winter.
  9. D'Antoni, Massimo & Pagano, Ugo, 2002. "National cultures and social protection as alternative insurance devices," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 367-386, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Edward P. Lazear & Richard B. Freeman, 1996. "Relational Investing: The Worker's Perspective," NBER Working Papers 5436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bird, Edward J., 2001. "Does the welfare state induce risk-taking?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 357-383, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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