Communication networks in the N-Player electronic mail game
AbstractThis paper shows that Rubinsteinâ€™s results on the two-player electronic mail game do not extend to the N-player electronic mail game.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07-10.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 80125, NL-3508 TC Utrecht
Phone: +31 30 253 9800
Fax: +31 30 253 7373
Web page: http://www.uu.nl/EN/faculties/leg/organisation/schools/schoolofeconomicsuse/Pages/default.aspx
More information through EDIRC
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-05-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2007-05-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-05-19 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2007-05-19 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-05-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Morris Stephen E, 2002. "Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-26, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marina Muilwijk).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.