Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game
AbstractThe electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
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- K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2007. "Communication networks in the N-Player electronic mail game," Working Papers 07-10, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011.
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- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-389, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Discussion Papers 1484, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2002.
"The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2007. "The E-Mail Game Revisited — Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 323-339.
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