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Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

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  • Morris Stephen E

    (Yale University)

Abstract

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

Suggested Citation

  • Morris Stephen E, 2002. "Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-26, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2002:i:1:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1027
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    Cited by:

    1. K. de Jaegher, 2007. "Communication Networks in the N-Player Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 07-10, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011. "Communication, timing, and common learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
    3. Kris De Jaegher, 2015. "Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 233-251, November.
    4. Koji Takamiya & Akira Tanaka, 2006. "Mutual Knowledge of Rationality in the Electronic Mail Game," ISER Discussion Paper 0650, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2020. "Organized Information Transmission," MPRA Paper 104302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Uwe Dulleck, 2007. "The E-Mail Game Revisited — Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 323-339.

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