Is it trust we model? An attempt to calculate the non-calculative
AbstractIn this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyze the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players' decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 05-12.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 80125, NL-3508 TC Utrecht
Phone: +31 30 253 9800
Fax: +31 30 253 7373
Web page: http://www.uu.nl/EN/faculties/leg/organisation/schools/schoolofeconomicsuse/Pages/default.aspx
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz, 2005. "Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative," CEPR Discussion Papers 5067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2005-10-29 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-10-29 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
- David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Wilson, Rick K., 2004. "Is trust a risky decision?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 447-465, December.
- Parkhe, Arvind, 1998. "Understanding trust in international alliances," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 219-240, October.
- Bull, Clive, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-59, February.
- Bohnet, Iris & Croson, Rachel, 2004. "Trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 443-445, December.
- Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May.
- Maarten Janssen, 2001. "Rationalizing Focal Points," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 119-148, March.
- Parkhe, Arvind, 1998. "Building trust in international alliances," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 417-437, January.
- Nooteboom, B. & Berger, H. & Noorderhaven, N.G., 1997. "Effects of trust and governance on relational risk," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73834, Tilburg University.
- Casajus, Andre, 2000. "Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 263-291, August.
- Bacharach, Michael & Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Variable-Frame Level-n Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 220-246, August.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999.
"Reputation and Imperfect Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
238, David K. Levine.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1986.
"Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment,"
585, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-80, March.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, 2010.
"On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
542, David K. Levine.
- Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
- Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
- De La Motte, Laura & Czernomoriez, Janna & Clemens, Marius, 2010.
"Zur Vertrauensökonomik: Der Interbankenmarkt in der Krise von 2007-2009
[Economics of trust: The interbank market during the crisis 2007-2009]," MPRA Paper 20357, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thijs Knaap).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.