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How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities

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  • Ana L. De La O

Abstract

Does clientelism perpetuate the weak state capacity that characterizes many young democracies? Prior work explains that clientelist parties skew public spending to private goods and under-supply public goods. Building on these insights, this article argues that clientelism creates a bureaucratic trap. Governments that rely on clientelism invest in labour-intensive, low-skilled bureaucracies that can design and implement relatively more straightforward distributive policies.

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  • Ana L. De La O, 2021. "How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-169, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-169
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
    2. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer, 2015. "Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 89657, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. Cruz, Cesi & Keefer, Philip, 2015. "Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6968, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Khemani, Stuti, 2015. "Buying votes versus supplying public services: Political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 84-93.
    5. Leopoldo Fergusson & Horacio Larreguy & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2022. "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2815-2834.
    6. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    7. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen & Shanna Rose, 2006. "The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the American States," EPRU Working Paper Series 06-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    8. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen & Shanna Rose, 2006. "The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the U.S. States," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(si), pages 1-2.
    9. De La O,Ana Lorena, 2015. "Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107089488.
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    Keywords

    Clientelism; State capacity; Bureaucratic capacity; political competition;
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