Advance Selling in the Presence of Experienced Consumers
AbstractThe advance selling strategy is implemented when a firm offers consumers the opportunity to order its product in advance of the regular selling season. Advance selling reduces uncertainty for both the firm and the buyer and enables the firm to update its forecast of future demand. The distinctive feature of the present theoretical study of advance selling is that we divide consumers into two groups, experienced and inexperienced. Experienced consumers know their valuations of the product in advance. The presence of experienced consumers yields new insights. Specifically, pre-orders from experienced consumers lead to a more precise forecast of future demand by the firm. We show that the firm will always adopt advance selling and that the optimal pre-order price may or may not be at a discount to the regular selling price.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 1108.
Date of creation: 30 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
advance selling; the Newsvendor Problem; demand uncertainty; experienced consumers; inexperienced consumers.;
Other versions of this item:
- Oksana Loginova & X. Hnery Wang & Chenhang Zeng, 2012. "Advance Selling in the Presence of Experienced Consumers," Working Papers 1213, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-10-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-10-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MKT-2011-10-01 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin, 2008.
"Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin & Rosar, Frank, 2011. "Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 141-162, January.
- Jinhong Xie & Steven M. Shugan, 2001. "Electronic Tickets, Smart Cards, and Online Prepayments: When and How to Advance Sell," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 219-243, June.
- Özalp Özer & Wei Wei, 2006. "Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1238-1257, August.
- Chenhang Zeng, 2012.
"Optimal Advance Selling Strategy under Price Commitment,"
SDU Working Papers
2012-03, School of Economics, Shandong University.
- Chenhang Zeng, 2013. "Optimal Advance Selling Strategy under Price Commitment," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 233-258, 05.
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