Brand Familiarity and Product Knowledge in Customization
AbstractThis paper challenges the assumption commonly used in the theoretical literature on customization that consumers always get their ideal varieties when they purchase a customized product. I adopt Hotelling's horizontal diffierentiation model with two firms competing for a continuum of consumers. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and possesses a certain level of category-specific knowledge. Initially, the firms produce standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Suppose one of the firms offers customization. Consumers familiar with the brand can easily transfer their needs into appropriate characteristics of this brand. Consumers unfamiliar with the brand have difficulty in expressing their preferences. Category-specific knowledge is crucial here. Knowledgeable consumers are more capable of analyzing information than less knowledgeable ones, and the products they design better match their preferences. The game runs as follows. First, the firms simultaneously decide whether to offer customization, then engage in price competition. I show that while customization makes the products less differentiated, the frictions introduced into consumer co-design activities relax price competition. As a result, customization by one of the firms occurs in equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0905.
Date of creation: 31 Jan 2009
Date of revision:
horizontal di fferentiation; price competition; customization; brand familiarity; product knowledge;
Other versions of this item:
- Oksana Loginova, 2010. "Brand familiarity and product knowledge in customization," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 297-309.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Loginova, Oksana & Wang, X. Henry, 2013. "Mass customization in an endogenous-timing game with vertical differentiation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 164-173.
- Oksana Loginova & X. Hnery Wang, 2013. "Customization in an Endogenous-Timing Game with Vertical Differentiation," Working Papers 1304, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
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