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Quel équilibre entre protection ex ante et compensations ex post dans la réforme de l’assurance agro-climatique ?

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Rozan
  • Sandrine Spaeter

Abstract

L’Etat français et les assureurs privés proposent de réformer en profondeur le système de couverture des risques agro-climatiques des exploitants agricoles. Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à l’articulation entre protection et assurance à l’aulne de cette réforme adoptée le 2 mars 2022 et dont les décrets sont attendus en 2023. A l’aide d’un modèle simple de décision dans le risque, nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles protection et assurance décidées par l’exploitant sont substituables ou complémentaires selon que l’effort de protection reste une information privée de l’exploitant, ou qu’il est pris en compte soit par l’assureur soit par l’Etat. Contrairement à l’intuition première, nous montrons qu’un niveau élevé de subvention de la prime d’assurance visant à inciter l’exploitant à s’assurer diminue, dans le même temps, ses incitations à investir en techniques de protection de ses cultures alors même que l’assureur en tient compte. Il est toutefois possible de définir un taux de subvention tel que, lorsque l’Etat décide de le faire dépendre des niveaux de protection de l’exploitant, assurance et protection deviennent complémentaires. La question du partage du financement de la protection entre assureurs privés et Etat, ainsi que celle de la modulation de la subvention en fonction de l’efficacité des technologies de protection disponibles par culture sont discutées.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Rozan & Sandrine Spaeter, 2022. "Quel équilibre entre protection ex ante et compensations ex post dans la réforme de l’assurance agro-climatique ?," Working Papers of BETA 2022-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2022-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    risques agro-climatiques; assurance privée; fonds public; réforme; incitations.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G52 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Insurance
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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