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Implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Mahul

    (Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Brian Davern Wright

    (LBNL - Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory [Berkeley])

Abstract

We investigate the demand for insurance when contracts are subject, with positive probability, to two distinct types of incomplete performance. When partial performance means payment of some fraction of the indemnity under full performance, the latter exhibits a disappearing deductible. When partial performance is due to insufficient financial capacity, optimal insurance contracts, for any given level of financial capacity, offer full marginal coverage above a deductible. For either type of non‐performance, the optimal deductible under full performance is positive when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair price.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Mahul & Brian Davern Wright, 2004. "Implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance," Post-Print hal-01952109, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01952109
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rustam Ibragimov & Dwight Jaffee & Johan Walden, 2018. "Equilibrium with Monoline and Multiline Structures [Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 595-632.
    2. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Eric LANGLAIS, 2008. "On Insurance Contract Design For Low Probability Events," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 3(2(4)_Summ).
    4. Eric Langlais, 2008. "On insurance contract design for low probability events," Working Papers hal-04140722, HAL.
    5. Reichel, Lukas & Schmeiser, Hato & Schreiber, Florian, 2022. "On the optimal management of counterparty risk in reinsurance contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 374-394.
    6. André Schmitt & Sandrine Spaeter, 2022. "Providing Pandemic Business Interruption Coverage with Double Trigger Cat Bonds," Working Papers of BETA 2022-05, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    7. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2018. "Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(1), pages 39-76, May.
    8. Markus Huggenberger & Peter Albrecht, 2022. "Risk pooling and solvency regulation: A policyholder's perspective," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(4), pages 907-950, December.
    9. André Schmitt & Sandrine Spaeter, 2023. "Providing pandemic business interruption coverage with double trigger cat bonds," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(3), pages 687-713, July.
    10. Mahul, Olivier & Wright, Brian D., 2007. "Optimal coverage for incompletely reliable insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 456-461, June.
    11. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    12. Burren, Daniel, 2013. "Insurance demand and welfare-maximizing risk capital—Some hints for the regulator in the case of exponential preferences and exponential claims," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 551-568.
    13. Laux, Christian & Muermann, Alexander, 2010. "Financing risk transfer under governance problems: Mutual versus stock insurers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 333-354, July.
    14. Anne Rozan & Sandrine Spaeter, 2022. "Quel équilibre entre protection ex ante et compensations ex post dans la réforme de l’assurance agro-climatique ?," Working Papers of BETA 2022-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    15. Reichel, Lukas & Schmeiser, Hato & Schreiber, Florian, 2021. "Sometimes more, sometimes less: Prudence and the diversification of risky insurance coverage," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 292(2), pages 770-783.
    16. Yuechen Dai & Richard Watt, 2023. "Adverse Selection with the Boot on the Other Foot: Insurer Insolvency as a Problem in Asymmetric Information," Working Papers in Economics 23/02, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.

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