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The Argentina Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Management, Bad Politics, Bad Advice

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  • Andrew Powell

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  • Andrew Powell, 2002. "The Argentina Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Management, Bad Politics, Bad Advice," Business School Working Papers veinticuatro, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  • Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:veinticuatro
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    File URL: http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/empresarial/cif/pdfs-wp/wpcif-082002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruhl, Christof, 2001. "The bail-in problem: systematic goals, ad hoc means," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 3-32, March.
    2. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
    3. Michael Mussa, 2002. "Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy," Peterson Institute Press: Policy Analyses in International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa67, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Perry, Guillermo & Serven, Luis, 2003. "The anatomy of a multiple crisis : why was Argentina special and what can we learn from it?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3081, The World Bank.
    2. William R. Cline, 2003. "Restoring economic growth in Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3158, The World Bank.
    3. José Mourelle, 2010. "Fiscal and exchange rate policies during the Argentine and Uruguayan crisis of 2001-2002," Documentos de trabajo 2010012, Banco Central del Uruguay.
    4. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "Ce qu’on en dit après : le « currency board » argentin et sa fin tragique," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 75(2), pages 129-151.
    5. Cavallo, Eduardo A. & Fernández-Arias, Eduardo & Powell, Andrew, 2014. "Is the Euro-zone on the Mend? Latin American examples to analyze the Euro question," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 243-257.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6827 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6827 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Federico Sturzenegger, 2002. "Defaults in the 90´s: Factbook and Preliminary Lessons," Business School Working Papers veintidos, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    9. Berger, Allen N. & Clarke, George R.G. & Cull, Robert & Klapper, Leora & Udell, Gregory F., 2005. "Corporate governance and bank performance: A joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(8-9), pages 2179-2221, August.
    10. Augusto de la Torre & Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2003. "Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 43-108, January.
    11. World Bank, 2003. "Argentina : Reforming Policies and Institutions for Efficiency and Equity of Public Expenditures," World Bank Publications - Reports 14637, The World Bank Group.
    12. Tai‐kuang Ho & Ya‐chi Lin & Kuo‐chun Yeh, 2021. "The case for starting a new exchange rate after debt settlement: Reexamining alternatives to Argentina’s exchange rate policy in 2001–2002," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 641-662, August.
    13. Jean Grugel & Maria Pia Riggirozzi, 2007. "The Return of the State in Argentina," WEF Working Papers 0018, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    14. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    15. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6827 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "Ce qu’on en dit après : le « currency board » argentin et sa fin tragique," Post-Print hal-01019663, HAL.
    17. Ricardo Lopez Murphy & Daniel Artana & Fernando Navajas, 2003. "The Argentine Economic Crisis," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 23(1), pages 23-28, Spring/Su.
    18. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "Ce qu'on en dit après - le Currency Board argentin et sa fin tragique," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6827, Sciences Po.
    19. Michael Bleaney, 2004. "Argentina's Currency Board Collapse: Weak Policy or Bad Luck?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 699-714, May.
    20. Cavallo, Eduardo A. & Fernández-Arias, Eduardo & Powell, Andrew, 2014. "Is the Euro-zone on the Mend? Latin American examples to analyze the Euro question," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 243-257.

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