We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. The platform monopolist can benefit from competition for three reasons. First, his profits from the platform increase. Second, competition serves as a credible commitment to lower prices for applications. Third, higher expected product diversity may lead to higher demand for his application. Results carry over to non-software platforms and, partially, to upstream and downstream firms. The model also explains why Microsoft Office is priced significantly higher than Microsoft's operating system.
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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number
dp0604.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Volker Nocke & Martin Peitz & Konrad Stahl, 2004.
"Platform Ownership,"
Discussion Papers
16, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Volker Nocke & Martin Peitz & Konrad Stahl, 2004.
"Platform Ownership,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
04-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]