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The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum

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Author Info
Peters, Michael

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Abstract

The paper proves existence of equilibrium in a fairly general version of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous payoffs, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. Three assumptions are imposed on the matching process that occurs after investments are realized. It must be assortative, it must resolve ties efficiently, and it must not allow externalities.

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File URL: http://microeconomics.ca/michael_peters/matching_limit_sim_add.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number peters-05-12-16-12-42-35.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 16 Dec 2005
Date of revision: 17 Mar 2006
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-05-12-16-12-42-35

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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Peters).

Related research
Keywords: pre-marital investment; assortative matching; equilibrium in discontinuous games;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  2. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Peters, Michael, 2004. "The Pre-Marital Investment Game," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-04-02-18-01-42-09, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 13 Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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