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Envy and Loss Aversion in Tournaments

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  • Gerald Eisenkopf
  • Sabrina Teyssier

Abstract

In tournaments, the large variance in effort provision is incompatible with standard economic theory. In our experiment we test theoretical predictions about the role of envy and loss aversion in tournaments. Our results confirm that envy implies higher effort while loss aversion increases the variance of effort. Moreover, we show that standard theory provides a good explanation for competitive behavior when envy and loss aversion do not play a role in the decision making process.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 52.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0052

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Keywords: Tournament; Envy; Loss Aversion;

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  1. Envy and Loss Aversion in Tournaments
    by Miguel in Simoleon Sense on 2010-07-15 23:05:35
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Cited by:
  1. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2013. "The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests," TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz 87, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  2. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2013. "When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 13-33, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  3. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Verbeke, Willem, 2014. "Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-13.
  4. Ludwig, Sandra & Lünser, Gabriele K., 2012. "Observing your competitor – The role of effort information in two-stage tournaments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 166-182.
  5. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2013. "The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-26, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  6. Steven Tucker & Charles Noussair & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, 07.
  7. David, Gill & Rebecca, Stone, 2012. "Desert and inequity aversion in teams," MPRA Paper 36864, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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