Price Reveal Auctions
AbstractA price reveal auction is a Dutch auction in which the current price of the item on sale remains hidden. Bidders can privately observe the price only by paying a fee, and every time a bidder does so, the price falls by a predetermined amount. We solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. If the number of participants n is common knowledge, then in equilibrium at most one bidder observes the price and the profits that the mechanism raises, if any, are only marginally higher than those that would stem from a normal sale. If instead n is a random variable then multiple entry can occur and profitability is enhanced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino in its series Working papers with number 015.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
pay-per-bid auctions; endogenous price decrease;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-12-06 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-12-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2012-12-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-06 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrea Gallice, 2009. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions with Signals," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 112, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised Sep 2009.
- Jürgen Eichberger & Dmitri Vinogradov, 2008. "Least Unmatched Price Auctions: A First Approach," Working Papers 0471, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Complicated auctions are more proftable
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-12-14 15:46:00
- Toomas Hinnosaar, 2013. "Penny Auctions are Unpredictable," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 305, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
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