Legal Damages at Uncertain Causation
AbstractThe legal notion of damages requires to compare the actual value of the creditorâ€™s assets with the hypothetical value that would have prevailed if the debtor had met his obligation. Moreover, values and causation may be uncertain. If natureâ€™s contribution is modelled as a random move then the interaction between debtor and nature can be described in normal form which, in turn, allows to capture causality and legal damages in a consistent way. In practice, such random moves of nature are rarely observable. Yet, statistical inference may reveal sufficient information to test for causation and to estimate legal damages on average over observable events as the present paper will establish.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 160.
Date of creation: Aug 2006
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More information through EDIRC
estimating legal damages; liability for torts; liability for breach of contracts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-08-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2006-08-26 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-08-26 (Regulation)
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