Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Tortious Acts Affecting Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Schweizer, Urs
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The present paper examines an injurer causing a temporary blackout to a firm as the primary victim but also affecting customers and competitors of the firm. Reflecting existing legal practice, the paper investigates efficiency properties of the negligence rule granting recovery of private losses but to the primary victim only. The regime is shown to provide efficient incentives for precaution provided that the primary loss exceeds the social loss from accidents. The main contribution of the paper consists of an explicit analysis of markets affected by a temporary blackout of one firm. The analysis reveals that the private loss exceeds the social loss indeed if the market is less than fully competitive. Moreover, the net social loss remains positive, no matter which market structure prevails.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13445/1/106.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 106.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Apr 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:106

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
    Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
    Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
    Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-47, June.
    3. Schweizer, Urs, 2005. "Law and Economics of Obligations," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 209-228, June.
    4. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    5. Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, . "The Economics Of Pure Economic Loss And The Internalisation Of Multiple Externalities," German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press 2003-1-1053, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    6. Gilead, Israel, 1997. "Tort law and internalization: The gap between private loss and social cost," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 589-608, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.