Duopoly in the Japanese Airline Market: Bayesian Estimation for the Entry Game
AbstractThis paper provides an econometric analysis on a duopoly game in the Japanese domestic airline market. We establish a novel Bayesian estimation approach for the entry game, which allows the incorporation of flexible inference techniques. We find asymmetric strategic interactions between Japanese firms, which implies that competition is still influenced by the former regulation regime. Furthermore, our prediction analysis indicates that the new Shizuoka airport will suffer from a lack of demand in the future.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-797.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Shinya Sugawara & Yasuhiro Omori, 2012. "Duopoly In The Japanese Airline Market: Bayesian Estimation For The Entry Game," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 310-332, 09.
- Shinya Sugawara & Yasuhiro Omori, 2010. "Duopoly in the Japanese Airline Market: Bayesian Estimation for the Entry Game," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-763, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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