Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection
AbstractThis paper examines development processes of a country when the degree of verifiability is endogenously determined. We characterize the development processes rigorously and show that although the efforts for improving of verifiability are important, the income distribution of a country is crucial for the effectiveness of efforts to the development processes. Moreover, this paper explains the situation where one country shows high growth rates temporally even if the technology of enforcement is poor, but eventually it experiences economic collapses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-276.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Munetomo Ando & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2004. "Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection," CARF F-Series CARF-F-004, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- NEP-ALL-2004-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2004-05-16 (Development)
- NEP-REG-2004-05-26 (Regulation)
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