Employment Protection Regulations and New Hiring
AbstractIn the real world, there are various regulations concerned with the dismissal of employees. We consider the effects of dismissal regulations with a simple incomplete labor contract model. Under moral hazard, the existence of a regulation always increases wage level and decreases firms' profits. However, the regulation can improve social welfare if workers' outside option is sufficiently low. Furthermore, we will show that the regulation can enhance new hiring.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-88.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2000
Date of revision:
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-09-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2000-09-01 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2000-09-01 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2000-09-01 (Regulation)
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