Forms, importance and working of social institutions
AbstractSocial institutions are persistent regularities in contracting and other relations amongst men and in the unintended consequences of such rule-like behavior. They include morality and law as well as institutions of governance such as branding and advertising. Institutions are studied in all approaches and schools of economics, and each involves its peculiar emphases. The purpose of the paper is to give an overview of the forms, importance and working of social institutions by taking examples from decision making of consumers. Use is made in particular of the findings of transaction-cost, evolutionary and behavioral economics. The paper is part of a Finnish open access textbook Principles of Institutional Economics in progress (www.ace-economics.fi/mvihanto).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 49.
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
social institutions; institutional economics; transaction costs; heuristic behavior;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2009-07-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2009-07-11 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-07-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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