Evolutionary Economics and Moral Relativism - Some Thoughts
AbstractDoubts about the decidability of moral questions have often been used as an excuse for economists to eschew any normative propositions. Evolutionary economics, still lacking a well-developed normative branch, gives rise to a form of descriptive moral relativism. This paper wants to explore the consequences of adopting a form of meta-ethical and normative moral relativism as well. It develops a normative position called ‘naturalistic relativism’, which is a naturalistically reconstructed neo-pragmatist form of relativism. The paper also gives an argument why this position seems to be the adequate normative correlate for evolutionary economics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1484.
Date of creation: 22 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
evolutionary economics; moral relativism; sensory utilitarianism; continuity hypothesis; naturalistic relativism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z00 - Other Special Topics - - General - - - General
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-01-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-01-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2007-01-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2007-01-23 (Post Keynesian Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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