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Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms

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  • Hollanders, D.A.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Vis, B.

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  • Hollanders, D.A. & Vis, B., 2009. "Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms," Other publications TiSEM b07d1e30-5614-415f-b1a0-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b07d1e30-5614-415f-b1a0-74c437ef5149
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Lieberman, Robert C., 2002. "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(4), pages 697-712, December.
    7. Fiona Ross, 2000. "Framing Welfare Reform in Affluent Societies: Rendering Retrenchment more Palatable?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 15, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    8. James P. Allan & Lyle Scruggs, 2004. "Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 496-512, July.
    9. Ross, Fiona, 2000. "Framing Welfare Reform in Affluent Societies: Rendering Restructuring More Palatable?," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 169-193, August.
    10. Jens Høj & Vincenzo Galasso & Giuseppe Nicoletti & Thai-Thanh Dang, 2006. "The Political Economy of Structural Reform: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 501, OECD Publishing.
    11. Bank for International Settlements, 2007. "Institutional investors, global savings and asset allocation," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 27, december.
    12. Tito Boeri & Axel Börsch-Supan & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey of European citizens," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 08-50.
    13. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    14. Tito Boeri & Axel Boersch-Supan & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Pension Reforms and the Opinions of European Citizens," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 396-401, May.
    15. van Groezen, Bas & Kiiver, Hannah & Unger, Brigitte, 2009. "Explaining Europeans' preferences for pension provision," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 237-246, June.
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