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Monetary policy and the rule of law

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Stadhouders, P.

Abstract

The translation of legal independence into actual independence is primarily determined by the rule of law. Inspired by the economic growth literature, where the role of institutions already is incorporated, we introduce Institutional Quality Indicators that can be used as reasonable proxies for the rule of law in a country. This idea can be seen as an important extension of the existing empirical research about the relationship between inflation and the institutional design of monetary institutions. With the rule of law factor we will get a better expression of effective central bank independence. Transition economies like former socialist economies in Europe are interesting candidates for the examination of the relationship between the rate of inflation, central bank reforms and the transition process. Legal Transition Indicators will be used as proxy for the rule of law in these countries. The liberalization process seems to be an important condition for the effectiveness of legal central bank independence. With the Cumulative Liberalization Index we incorporate the liberalization process into our analysis.
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Suggested Citation

  • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Stadhouders, P., 2003. "Monetary policy and the rule of law," Other publications TiSEM 06ec49a8-40ad-46cb-8040-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:06ec49a8-40ad-46cb-8040-c8d815527578
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    2. Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-1448, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schönfelder, Nina & Wagner, Helmut, 2015. "The impact of European integration on institutional development," MPRA Paper 63392, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
    4. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers 21, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Ichiro Iwasaki & Akira Uegaki, 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Transition Economies: A Comparative Meta-Analysis with Developed and Developing Economies," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(3), pages 197-235, May.
    6. Hartwell, Christopher A., 2018. "The “Hierarchy of Institutions” reconsidered: Monetary policy and its effect on the rule of law in interwar Poland," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 37-70.
    7. Anita Angelovska - Bezhoska, 2018. "Central bank independence-the case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia," Working Papers 2018-01, National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia.
    8. Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Sophia Gollwitzer, 2010. "The Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Commitment in Weak(er) Institutional Environments," IMF Working Papers 2010/193, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Central Banks And Macroprudential Policies: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1878, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    12. Alicia García Herrero & Pedro del Río, 2003. "Financial stability and the design of monetary policy," Working Papers 0315, Banco de España.
    13. Stéphane Goutte & David Guerreiro & Bilel Sanhaji & Sophie Saglio & Julien Chevallier, 2019. "International Financial Markets," Post-Print halshs-02183053, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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