Emissions Trading and Intersectoral Dynamics: Absolute versus Relative Design Schemes
AbstractThis paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emis- sions trading in a two-sector (clean and dirty) economy. We compare the welfare implica- tions of an absolute cap-and-trade scheme (permit trading) with a relative intensity-based scheme (credit trading). We nd unambiguously more clean rms in the long run under credit trading. However, neither emissions trading con guration creates the rst-best out- come: there are too few (many) clean rms under permit (credit) trading. Permit trading dominates credit trading in terms of overall welfare at the long run equilibrium, except when policy is relatively lenient. It is also demonstrated that stricter policy does not necessarily induce the clean sector to grow relative to the dirty sector and we determine under what conditions this holds.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Stirling, Division of Economics in its series Stirling Economics Discussion Papers with number 2011-15.
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
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Postal: Division of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
Phone: +44 (0)1786 467473
Fax: +44 (0)1786 467469
Web page: http://www.econ.stir.ac.uk/
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sectoral dynamics; pollution control; industrial change; imperfect competition; emissions trading;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-08-15 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-08-15 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-08-15 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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