Rent-sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data
AbstractIn many European countries, the majority of workers have their wages directly defined by industry-level agreements. In addition, for some workers, industry agreements are complemented by firm-specific agreements. Yet, the relative importance of firm and industry agreements (in other words, the degree of centralization) differs drastically across industries. The authors of this paper use unique linked employer-employee data from a 2003 survey in Belgium to examine how these bargaining features affect the extent of rent-sharing. Their results show that there is substantially more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized industries, even when controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes. Moreover, in centralized industries, rent-sharing is found only for workers that are covered by a firm agreement. Finally, results indicate that within decentralized industries, both firm and industry bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same extent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 09-004.RS.
Length: 39 p.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by:
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Rent-sharing; collective bargaining; propensity score matching.;
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Rusinek & François Rycx, 2013. "Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 51(1), pages 28-58, 03.
- Michael Rusinek & François Rycx, 2013. "Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/167744, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Rusinek, Michael & Rycx, Francois, 2008. "Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data," IZA Discussion Papers 3406, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Michael Rusinek & François Rycx, 2008. "Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes: evidence from linked employer-employee data," DULBEA Working Papers 08-09.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Michael Rusinek & François Rycx, 2008. "Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes : Evidence from linked employer-employee data," Working Paper Research 152, National Bank of Belgium.
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-01-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-01-24 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2009-01-24 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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