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Rent-sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

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Author Info
Michael Rusinek () (DULBEA, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels)
François Rycx () (Centre Emile Bernheim, DULBEA, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels and IZA-Bonn.)

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Abstract

In many European countries, the majority of workers have their wages directly defined by industry-level agreements. In addition, for some workers, industry agreements are complemented by firm-specific agreements. Yet, the relative importance of firm and industry agreements (in other words, the degree of centralization) differs drastically across industries. The authors of this paper use unique linked employer-employee data from a 2003 survey in Belgium to examine how these bargaining features affect the extent of rent-sharing. Their results show that there is substantially more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized industries, even when controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes. Moreover, in centralized industries, rent-sharing is found only for workers that are covered by a firm agreement. Finally, results indicate that within decentralized industries, both firm and industry bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same extent.

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File URL: http://www.solvay.edu/EN/Research/Bernheim/documents/wp09004.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB) in its series Working Papers CEB with number 09-004.RS.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:09-004

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Related research
Keywords: Rent-sharing; collective bargaining; propensity score matching.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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  1. Olivier Debande & Jean-Luc De Meulemeester, 2008. "Quality and variety competition in higher education," Working Papers DULBEA 08-12.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Benoît Mahy & François Rycx & Mélanie Volral, 2008. "L’influence de la dispersion salariale sur la performance des grandes entreprises belges," Working Papers DULBEA 08-13.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Ariane Szafarz, 2008. "Labor market discrimination as an agency cost," Working Papers DULBEA 08-19.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
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