Legislating a Rule for Monetary Policy
AbstractI discuss a proposal to legislate a rule for monetary policy. The proposal modernizes laws first passed in the late 1970s, but largely discarded in 2000. It would thereby restore reporting and accountability requirements for the instruments of monetary policy. It would limit but not eliminate discretion. The proposal provides a degree of control by the political authorities without interfering in the day-to-day operations of monetary policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-032.
Date of creation: Jul 2011
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Taylor, John B. & Williams, John C., 2010.
"Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy,"
Handbook of Monetary Economics,
in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 15, pages 829-859
- John B. Taylor & John C. Williams, 2010. "Simple and robust rules for monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2010-10, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- John B. Taylor & John C. Williams, 2010. "Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 15908, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pier Francesco Asso & George A. Kahn & Robert Leeson, 2007. "The Taylor rule and the transformation of monetary policy," Research Working Paper RWP 07-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
- John B. Taylor, 2013. "The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence Versus Policy Rules," Discussion Papers 12-009, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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