How Diagnostic Tests Affect Prevention: a Cost-Benefit Analysis
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to offers insight for evaluating research and development in diagnostic tests. We show that a rational policy maker perfectly informed about health risks may choose to reduce investment in prevention when efficient diagnostic tests become available. We show that prevention and diagnostic tests are substitutes rather than complements. As a result the regular improvements in diagnostic technology that are observed can justify a lower investment on prevention at any given unitary price for this activity. The analysis is a useful tool for the allocation of funding between diagnostic and preventive medicine.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 53.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2001
Date of revision:
prevention; diagnostic tests;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-11-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2001-11-05 (Health Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2001-11-05 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- DIONNE, George & EECKHOUDT, Louis, .
"Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-623, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 39-42.
- Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1984. "Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 8424, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dardanoni, Valentino & Wagstaff, Adam, 1987. "Uncertainty, inequalities in health and the demand for health," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 283-290, December.
- Eeckhoudt, Louis R. & Lebrun, Thérèse C. & Sailly, Jean-Claude L., 1984. "The informative content of diagnostic tests: An economic analysis," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 18(10), pages 873-880, January.
- Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
- Selden, Thomas M., 1993. "Uncertainty and health care spending by the poor: The health capital model revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 109-115, April.
- Chang, Fwu-Ranq, 1996. "Uncertainty and investment in health," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 369-376, June.
- Stéphane Mechoulan, 2006. "Risky Sexual Behavior, Testing and New HIV Treatments," Working Papers tecipa-239, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.