IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rye/wpaper/wp079.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

International Sourcing, Complementary Inputs, and the Structure of Trade Agreements: Deep, Shallow, Narrow, and Wide

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Chisik

    (Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada)

  • Sara Rohany Tabatabai

    (Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada)

Abstract

We analyze Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation among a subset of members of a multilateral agreement when imported inputs are complementary to one another. A shallow (focused only on border policies) multilateral agreement does not place countries on the efficiency frontier. Furthermore, no subset of countries will form a shallow PTA. Alternatively, a deep PTA that addresses behind-the-border policies increases each country's welfare. This result suggests that the recent proliferation of PTA formation is driven by a need for deep integration. Although these deep PTAs increase welfare over a shallow multilateral agreement the efficiency frontier can only be reached by a deep multilateral agreement that covers both border and behind-the-border policies. Whether a deep PTA can generate consensus approval for further multilateral-deep integration depends on the structure of the PTA and the success of the multilateral-shallow agreement in lowering tariffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Chisik & Sara Rohany Tabatabai, 2020. "International Sourcing, Complementary Inputs, and the Structure of Trade Agreements: Deep, Shallow, Narrow, and Wide," Working Papers 079, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp079
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://chisik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135397809/wp079.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bown, Chad, 2020. "Export Controls: America’s Other National Security Threat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14739, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Eric W. Bond & Raymond G. Riezman & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2013. "A strategic and welfare theoretic analysis of free trade areas," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 8, pages 101-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. James R. Markusen, 2004. "Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633078, December.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    5. Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L. & Bickwit, Grant, 2021. "Preferential trade agreements and global sourcing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    6. Besedes, Tibor & Kohl, Tristan & Lake, James, 2020. "Phase out tariffs, phase in trade?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    7. Lake, James & Roy, Santanu, 2017. "Are global trade negotiations behind a fragmented world of “gated globalization”?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 117-136.
    8. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290.
    9. Mulabdic,Alen & Osnago,Alberto & Ruta,Michele, 2017. "Deep integration and UK-EU trade relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7947, The World Bank.
    10. Robert C. Johnson & Guillermo Noguera, 2017. "A Portrait of Trade in Value-Added over Four Decades," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 99(5), pages 896-911, December.
    11. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    12. Kamal Saggi & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2018. "Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 7, pages 156-167, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    14. Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2008. "Trade liberalization, outsourcing, and the hold-up problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 225-241, January.
    15. Pol Antràs & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3140-3183, December.
    16. Pol Antras & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Trade Agreements and the Nature of Price Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 470-476, May.
    17. Bond, Eric W. & Trachtman, Joel, 2016. "China–Rare Earths: Export Restrictions and the Limits of Textual Interpretation," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 189-209, April.
    18. Arvind Panagariya & Jagdish Bhagwati, 1996. "The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 51856, September.
    19. Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), 2014. "Handbook of International Economics," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 4, number 4.
    20. Saggi, Kamal & Wong, Woan Foong & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2019. "Should the WTO require free trade agreements to eliminate internal tariffs?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 316-330.
    21. Yeats, Alexander J, 1998. "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 12(1), pages 1-28, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
    2. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    3. Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L. & Bickwit, Grant, 2021. "Preferential trade agreements and global sourcing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    4. Ornelas, Emanuel & Tovar, Patricia, 2022. "Intra-bloc tariffs and preferential margins in trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    5. Lake, James & Nken, Moïse & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2020. "Tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Cole, Matthew T. & Lake, James & Zissimos, Ben, 2021. "Contesting an international trade agreement," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    8. Staiger, Robert & Bagwell, Kyle & Bown, Chad, 2015. "Is the WTO Passé?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Latorre, María C. & Yonezawa, Hidemichi, 2018. "Stopped TTIP? Its potential impact on the world and the role of neglected FDI," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 99-120.
    10. Yanase, Akihiko & Tsubuku, Masafumi, 2022. "Trade costs and free trade agreements: Implications for tariff complementarity and welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 23-37.
    11. Giovanni Maggi & Ralph Ossa, 2020. "Are Trade Agreements Good For You?," NBER Working Papers 27252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kamal Saggi & Woan Foong Wong & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2022. "The role of non‐discrimination in a world of discriminatory preferential trade agreements," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(1), pages 174-212, February.
    13. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2001. "Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 281-325, June.
    14. Ornelas, Emanuel, 2012. "Preferential trade agreements and the labor market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121752, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Stoyanov, Andrey & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2015. "Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 140-164.
    16. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1067-1104, November.
    17. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 1999. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    18. Ara, Tomohiro & Ghosh, Arghya, 2016. "Tariffs, vertical specialization and oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-23.
    19. Swati Dhingra & Rebecca Freeman & Eleonora Mavroeidi, 2018. "Beyond tariff reductions: what extra boost from trade agreement provisions?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1532, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    20. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp079. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Doosoo Kim (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deryeca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.