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An American Model for the EU Gas Market?

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  • Sergio Ascari

Abstract

It is generally believed that the American model is not suitable for Europe, yet North America is the only large and working competitive gas market in the world. The paper shows how its model could be adapted as a target for market design within the European institutional framework. It starts from analysis of the main peculiar economic features of the gas transportation industry, which should underpin any efficient model. After the Third Package is properly implemented the EU will share several building blocks of the American model: effective unbundling of transportation and supply; regulated tariffs which, for long distance transportation, are in fact largely related to capacity and distance; investments based mostly on industry’s initiative and resources, and the related decisions are increasingly made after open and public processes. Yet Europe needs to harmonize tariff regulation criteria, which could be achieved through a monitoring process. National separation of main investment decisions should be overcome, possibly by organising a common platform where market forces and public authorities interact with private suppliers to require existing and develop new capacity, whereas industry competitively offers its solutions. Such platform would allow for long term capacity reservation, subject to caps and congestion management provisions. Auctions and possibly market coupling would play an important role in the allocation of short term capacity but a limited one in long term. Market architecture and the organisation of hubs would also be developed mostly by market forces under regulatory oversight. The continental nature of the market suggests a likely concentration of trading in a very limited number of main markets, whereas minor markets would have a limited role and would be connected to major ones, with price differences reflecting transportation costs and market conditions. Excessive interference or pursuit of political goals in less than transparent ways involves the risk of slower liquidity development and higher market fragmentation. With this view as a background, regulatory work aimed at completing the European market should be based on ensuring the viability of interconnections between current markets and on the establishment of common platforms and co-ordinated tariff systems, fostering the conditions for upstream and transportation capacity development.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio Ascari, 2011. "An American Model for the EU Gas Market?," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/39, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2011/39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tanga McDaniel & Karsten Neuhoff, 2002. "Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experience," Working Papers EP06, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Growitsch & Marcus Stronzik, 2014. "Ownership unbundling of natural gas transmission networks: empirical evidence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 207-225, October.
    2. Keyaerts, Nico & D'haeseleer, William, 2014. "Forum shopping for ex-post gas-balancing services," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 209-221.
    3. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Joana Resende & Paula Sarmento & Isabel Soares, 2016. "Welfare effects of unbundling under different regulatory regimes in natural gas markets," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 15(2), pages 99-127, August.
    4. Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack & Jean-Michel Glachant, 2012. "Designing the European Gas Market: More Liquid & Less Natural?," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hubs; infrastructure; target model; network tariffs; gas market design; capacity allocation;
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