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Plant breeding, biodiversity loss and intellectual property rights

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Abstract

There is a general perception that modern agroecosystems have a negative biodiversity impact. The adverse implications are a reflection of modern varieties being bred from a narrow circle of parental genetic material and of the high level of genetic uniformity of the varieties. Existing literature suggests that the adoption of low-diversity agroecosystems is favoured because of possibilities of exploiting scale economies from the use of standard tools and knowledge. This trajectory of development is subsequently globalised because of path dependency and lock-in effects. The paper sheds a novel insight on this issue by historically examining the breeding of genetically uniform varieties. Institutional factors, like intellectual property rights, that reinforce the bias towards genetic uniformity are also examined. The paper concludes that the system of intellectual property rights were developed in a specific manner to provide juridical legitimisation to the breeding of genetically uniform varieties.

Suggested Citation

  • Rangnekar, Dwijen, 2000. "Plant breeding, biodiversity loss and intellectual property rights," Economics Discussion Papers 2000-5, School of Economics, Kingston University London.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:kngedp:2000_005
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    Cited by:

    1. Mercedes Campi, 2017. "The effect of intellectual property rights on agricultural productivity," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 48(3), pages 327-339, May.
    2. Dwijen Rangnekar, 2002. "R&D appropriability and planned obsolescence: empirical evidence from wheat breeding in the UK (1960--1995)," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(5), pages 1011-1029, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Plant breeding; intellectual property rights; genetic diversity; genetic erosion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General

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