Separation Without Mutual Exclusion in Financial Insurance
AbstractIn traditional economic models of insurance, sellers typically employ a non-linear pricing scheme to elicit type information from buyers. In financial insurance contracts, such a policy is not possible since contracts are non-exclusive. In addition, counterparty risk in financial contracts can be particularly problematic relative to traditional insurance. Accordingly, we relax the standard assumption of contract exclusivity and allow the insured to contract with many sellers, some of which may be unstable. In contrast to the traditional insurance model, we show that separation of risk types among insured parties can be achieved with linear pricing when there is aggregate counterparty risk. This result is shown to collapse when contracts are cleared through a central counterparty, suggesting that such an arrangement can create opacity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-8.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
insurance; separation; mutual exclusion; counterparty risk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-04-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2012-04-17 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University
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