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Alleged Transmission Undersupply: Is Restructuring the Cure or the Cause?

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Author Info
Brennan, Timothy () (Resources for the Future)
Abstract

Widespread concern over transmission capacity requires theoretical support to infer inadequacy from observed trends indicating reductions in the ratio of transmission to generation capacity over time. If integrated utilities had been regulated with allowed returns exceeding capital costs, transmission-generation ratios would have been excessive, and observed trends might be a correction. However, numerous commentators claim that post-restructuring transmission rates have been too low, with NIMBY also discouraging investment. We model the possibility that inadequate separation between generation and transmission may result in reduced investment, in order to preserve incumbent market power in generation. However, consideration of transmission price caps and coordinated generation investment support other analyses that conclude that vertical separation itself may be a culprit.

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Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-05-50.

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Date of creation: 31 Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-05-50

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Related research
Keywords: electricity transmission regulation deregulation vertical integration

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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  1. Kwoka, John E., 2002. "Vertical economies in electric power: evidence on integration and its alternatives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 653-671, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Severin Borenstein & James. Bushnell & Steven Stoft, 2000. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in A Deregulated Electricity Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 294-325, Summer.
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  3. Russell Pittman, 2005. "Structural Separation to Create Competition? The Case of Freight Railways," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 4(3), pages 181-196, September. [Downloadable!]
  4. Brennan, Timothy J, 1989. "Regulating by Capping Prices," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 133-47, June.
  5. Hogan, William W, 1992. "Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 211-42, September.
  6. Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin & Benz, Men-Andri, 2004. "Infrastructure quality in deregulated industries: is there an underinvestment problem?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 253-267, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 1991. "The Measurement of Vertical Economies and the Efficient Structure of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 483-502, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Reiffen, David, 1998. "A Regulated Firm's Incentive to Discriminate: A Reevaluation and Extension of Weisman's Result," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 79-86, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Martzoukos, Spiros H. & Teplitz-Sembitzky, Witold, 1992. "Optimal timing of transmission line investments in the face of uncertain demand : An option valuation approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-9, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. William J. Baumol & Alvin K. Klevorick, 1970. "Input Choices and Rate-of Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 162-190, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-66, November.
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