The Timing of New Technology Adoption: The Case of MRI
AbstractThis paper studies the adoption of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) by US hospitals. I consider a timing game of new technology adoption. The dynamic game allows me to take both timing decisions and strategic interaction into account. The model can be solved using standard dynamic programming techniques. Using a panel data set of US hospitals, cross sectional variation in adoption times, market structure and demand is exploited to recover the profit and cost parameters of the timing game. In counterfactual experiments I decompose the cost of competition into a business stealing and a preemption effect. I find substantial changes in adoption times and industry payoffs due to competition. These changes are mostly due to a business stealing effect. Preemption accounts for a significant but small share of this change
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2006 Meeting Papers with number 3.
Date of creation: 03 Dec 2006
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Technology Adoption; Preemption; Dynamic Oligopoly;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
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